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THE MEANING OF FEDERALISM IN A SYSTEM OF
INTERSTATE COMMERCE: FREE TRADE AMONG THE
SEVERAL STATES
Donald J. Kochan*
INTRODUCTION
As states become dissatisfied with either the direction of federal policy or the
gridlock that seems like a barrier frustrating action, their disdain or impatience is
increasingly manifest in state legislative or regulatory efforts to reach big issues
normally reserved to federal resolution. Increasingly, such efforts to stake a position
on issues of national or international importance are testing the limits of state
autonomy within a system of federalism that includes robust protection for the free
flow of commerce among the several states.
This Essay provides the primary historical backdrop against which these
measures should be judged with a particular emphasis on the importance of
sustaining a national market for commerce within our system of federalism. Too
often state initiatives are framed in terms of “states’ rights” seeking to capitalize on
the rhetorical power that phrase offers. If the states are told they cannot do X or Y,
those who favor local control within our democratic republic find appealing
arguments that national policy preventing states from acting is excessive. When
states are told they cannot act alone, some may fear that the federal government is
becoming too big and controlling and become suspicious of the claim of state
disempowerment. But even those who favor localized control must be cautious in
advocating in favor of “states’ rights,” a concept that is often nothing more than a
siren song. Those rocky shores sometimes harbor positions that would allow states
to act in a manner that is quite contrary to perhaps the most important aspect of
American federalism embodied in the Constitution—the constitutional facilitation
of a national free trade zone known as the United States wherein each independent
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unit is disabled from erecting barriers to trade under what is popularly termed the
Interstate Commerce Clause (although it may more appropriately be called the
Commerce Among the Several States Clause).
I.

RECENT EXAMPLES OF EMBOLDENED STATE ACTION SOMETIMES CONTRARY
TO FREE TRADE PRINCIPLES

States are increasingly retesting the waters of their authority to act as guardians
of high-order principles, attempting to use their lawmaking authority in ways
intended to produce external effects. 1 More and more, states want to change the
world, not just make their states better. As arbiters of good policy, many state
politicians see openings to legislate in ways that force changes in behavior, even in
other states or other nations.
Many states also seek to shift national policy by undertaking policy initiatives
themselves that they perceive the federal government not doing or not doing well,
sometimes (such as in immigration) seeking to find ways to act which directly
frustrate contrary national policy. There should be no doubt that states will use these
techniques with increasing frequency if they are legitimized. There already seems
to be an upward trend, and a few examples below will provide context.
In recent years in the state of Washington, for example, Governor Inslee and
his administration’s strong preference to promote alternative energy, protect against
climate change, and prevent coal exports has led to federal and state litigation over
whether that state may deny approvals for a coal export terminal that would facilitate
both interstate and foreign commerce in coal. 2
If the allegations in Lighthouse Resources, Inc. v. Inslee are true, Washington
has taken regulatory action that interferes with commerce from other states by
preventing out-of-state interests from having nondiscriminatory access to engage in
foreign commerce and interferes with foreign commerce in a manner that potentially
prejudices the interests of the federal government in speaking with one voice on
foreign affairs and foreign trade issues. 3 If coal exports are to be banned, it should
be a federal decision.
A state can be charged with unconstitutionally discriminating against the
interests in another state, even if their actions do not directly benefit an in-state
industry. All kinds of reasons, including raw political differences, can lead to
Dormant Commerce Clause violations. Market interference is often about protecting
preferred industries, including so-called “clean energy” or “green energy” industries
in Washington, and giving them a competitive edge over disfavored resources like
coal from out of state. Ultimately, in Lighthouse, harming the competitive

1 See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, The Extraterritoriality Doctrine of the Dormant Commerce
Clause Is Not Dead, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 497, 505–15 (2016) (listing multiple examples of states’
attempts to influence policy outside their borders).
2 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Lighthouse Res., Inc. v. Inslee,
No. 3:18-cv-05005, 2018 WL 6505372 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2018) (No. 3:18-cv-05005).
3 See id. at 45–48.
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(politically or literally) traditional energy producers is beneficial to Washington’s
preferred interest groups.
The Washington example is not isolated. We already see how some food or
agricultural standards in states like California necessarily result in controls on
behaviors in other states. Consider how goose feeding is constrained by foie gras
regulations, and cage sizes for chickens are impacted in other states when California
bans the sales of eggs not produced in what it believes are minimally humane
conditions.4 Other very recent examples of states pushing the envelope include New
York’s 2017 cybersecurity regulations which controlled information sharing policies
across state lines,5 Tennessee’s residency requirements for liquor licenses,6 and
Maryland’s price control laws on pharmaceutical drug sales. 7
States are finding ways to pretextually advance an “in-state” hook to control
out-of-state behavior that they find inconsistent with their policy, moral, or other
preferences. Fuel standards developed in Oregon and California, for example, by
functional necessity have had the extraterritorial effect of regulating how companies
produce fuel in other states by targeting out-of-state action rather than grounding
their regulations in a justification of controlling in-state harm.8 Similarly, failure to
protect the Founders’ vision of free trade federalism might encourage a state to think
creatively about ways to expressly or in effect control out-of-state behaviors
inconsistent with its preferred policy positions. States wanting to minimize timber
harvesting and sales might find ways to deny transportation routes through their
states—for example, Washington might try to forbid transportation of timber
through its state, effectively restricting commerce between Colorado or Wyoming
timber company sellers and Canadian buyers. Or, states with strong union
protections could seek to constrain sales of products made in “right to work” states
like Michigan or Wisconsin by placing transportation restrictions on goods produced
under “disfavored” conditions from passing into or through their states, and vice

4 See generally, e.g., Ernesto Hernández-López, Food, Animals, and the Constitution:
California Bans on Pork, Foie Gras, Shark Fins, and Eggs, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 347, 348–72
(2017). See also Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 949
(9th Cir. 2013) (upholding foie gras regulations against commerce clause challenge).
5 See Matthew A. Schwartz & Corey Omer, The Constitutionality of State Cybersecurity
Regulations, BANKING PERSP. (July 3, 2017), https://www.bankingperspectives.com/theconstitutionality-of-state-cybersecurity-regulations/.
6 See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019) (invalidating
Tennessee residency-based liquor law requirements as violating the Commerce Clause).
7 See Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding state law
unconstitutional as violating Dormant Commerce Clause when it imposed price controls with
effects on upstream sales of drugs outside state’s borders); see also Darien Shanske & Jane Horvath,
Maryland’s Generic Drug Pricing Law Is Constitutional: A Recent Decision Misunderstands the
Structure
of
the
Industry,
HEALTH
AFF.
(June
22,
2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180621.752771/full/.
8 See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 913 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2019)
(upholding standards against a commerce clause challenge); Debra Kahn, California to Extend
Low-Carbon
Fuel
Standard
Through
2030,
SCI. AM. (Apr.
30,
2018),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/california-to-extend-low-carbon-fuel-standardthrough-2030/.
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versa. Or, as noted by the National Mining Association and others, as amici curiae
in the Lighthouse case, the Washington coal export terminal denial could serve as
precedent to encourage California to deny port access and refuse to permit new port
facilities for agricultural exports if it disagrees with the manner in which livestock
are raised in another state.9 Or, as also stated in the brief, South Carolina could
refuse port access for manufactured goods that rely on immigrant labor if it disagrees
with the liberal immigration policies that contribute to that labor supply. 10
The main point here is that states respond to precedents set. And states
increasingly seem interested in testing the limits of their authority, including bigger
states which have the ability to flex some muscle based on their size and market
power, as well as states that have power because they control vital passages of
commerce like sea ports.
Yet, it was precisely to prevent bullying by big states or manipulation of
markets by any state that motivated the Framers to include the commerce clauses in
the first place. Alexander Hamilton understood this well. One passage in Federalist
No. 22 illustrates that precedents will be abused and will invite more unneighborly
conduct:
The interfering and unneighbourly regulations of some States contrary to the true
spirit of the Union, have in different instances given just cause of umbrage and
complaint to others; and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not
restrained by a national controul, would be multiplied and extended till they
became not less serious sources of animosity and discord, than injurious
impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the confederacy.11

On many of these issues, one could very well agree with the policy a state prefers
over a policy that the existing federal administration prefers. But that is not the point
in our system of free trade federalism facilitated through the Commerce Among the
Several States Clause in the Constitution.12
The point is that the Constitution prescribes the appropriate means of achieving
policy in a federal system. This Essay’s discussion examines a Constitution which
attempts to coordinate conflicts and often expressly allocates powers in a way the
Founders believed would best achieve very important policy ends—namely, the
protection of markets from unnecessary interference or chaos from a multitude of
regulatory voices.

9 Brief of the National Mining Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion for Partial Dismissal and Abstention at 14, Lighthouse Res., Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv05005, 2018 WL 6505372 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2018) (No. 3:18-cv-05005).
10 Id.
11 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
12 Nothing I will say about these policies should be seen as stating a personal preference for
one position or another.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW REFLECTION

170

II.

[VOL. 95:5

FEDERALISM, FREE TRADE, AND THE MULTIPLE CLAUSES REGARDING
COMMERCE

The U.S. Constitution provides the architecture for a federalist system that
manages relations between the states and between the state and federal government
in a manner that protects and facilitates free trade among the states and free trade
between the United States and foreign nations or Indian tribes. The key
constitutional language is in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, which gives Congress the
power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.”13 A corollary doctrine associated with this language is
what is often referred to as the “Dormant Commerce Clause.” Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence is based on the idea that the federal power to regulate
commerce is exclusive and, as such, any state interference with commerce among
the several states constitutes a violation of that prerogative and also runs contrary to
the constitutional mandate that the regulation of commerce is designed to make
commerce “regular,” not impeded. The historical background of these commerce
clauses supports the idea that they are designed to enshrine in constitutional law a
high level of protection for free trade principles and to limit state authority to the
extent its exercise interferes with the flow of commerce within the United States or
impedes commerce between the United States as a collective and foreign nations or
Indian tribes.
To provide this historical understanding, this Essay principally examines two
key questions: (1) In a constitutional system grounded in principles of federalism,
what are the inherent limits on states?; and (2) What are the grand purposes of the
combined commerce clauses—or what might be deemed the free trade clauses? The
latter question can only be answered by understanding the deep commercial
infirmities identified in the Articles of Confederation at the Founding—given the
human nature, if you will, of states versus states—and by understanding the deep
concerns for developing constitutional rules to protect and facilitate markets and to
counteract the natural tendencies of states to act in the selfish, petty, greedy, and
discriminatory ways that impede both the interests of other states and the interests
of the Nation as a whole.
It cannot be overstated that the Framers saw the commerce clauses as a vital
feature of the new Constitution that were necessary to combat grave infirmities seen
in the Articles of Confederation. Their market-facilitating and free trade purposes
were evident to the Framers and should guide our understanding of them today. As
Joseph Story exclaimed in A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United
States, section 164:
The power to regulate commerce “among the several States[]” . . . annihilated the
cause of domestic feuds and rivalries. It compelled every State to regard the
interests of each, as the interests of all; and thus diffused over all the blessings of

13

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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a free, active, and rapid exchange of commodities, upon the footing of perfect
equality.14

Story’s reflections on the importance of the commercial clauses in the Constitution
importantly stress that these clauses are the true glue that hold us together as a
peaceful nation. They help ensure that each state may capitalize on the benefits of
uniting within a common marketplace. They help states realize mutual gains that
would be impossible without union and, more importantly, without a constitutional
infrastructure that holds all states to a set of rules that ensures the continuation of
that common market and prevents any one state from shirking, self-dealing, or
cheating other states out of the benefits of the commercial union.
State actions which may possibly interfere with these commerce clause goals
are subject to a high level of scrutiny because, as Alexander Hamilton expressed in
Federalist No. 11, “[t]here are rights of great moment to the trade of America, which
are rights of the Union.”15 Hamilton also stressed that the Constitution was adopted
to create “[a]n unrestrained intercourse between the States . . . advanc[ing] the trade
of each, by an interchange of their respective productions.” 16 Otherwise, interstate
and foreign trade would be “fettered, interrupted and narrowed by a multiplicity of
causes.”17
Part of the reason for giving the federal government control over foreign
commerce decisions was to allow the federal government to use the power (and
restraint of the power) when negotiating with foreign nations and incentivizing
behavior. Joseph Story has an excellent passage in A Familiar Exposition of the
Constitution of the United States that captures this idea. In section 171, Story states:
Many . . . powers have been applied in the regulation of foreign commerce. The
commercial system of the United States has also been employed sometimes for
the purpose of revenue; sometimes for the purpose of prohibition; sometimes for
the purpose of retaliation and commercial reciprocity; sometimes to lay
embargoes; sometimes to encourage domestic navigation, and the shipping and
mercantile interest, by bounties, by discriminating duties, and by special
preferences and privileges; and sometimes to regulate intercourse with a view to
mere political objects, such as to repel aggressions, increase the pressure of war,
or vindicate the rights of neutral sovereignty. In all these cases, the right and duty
have been conceded to the National Government by the unequivocal voice of the
people.18

One state (like Washington) with access to the ports of commerce, for example,
should not be able to have a veto power over the landlocked states’ ability to access
these ports which are necessarily part of the market system left within the exclusive
regulation of the federal government under both commerce clauses and their
dormant components. “[T]he peculiar situation [was] some of the States, which
having no convenient ports for foreign commerce, were subject to be taxed by their
14 JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 164, at 141 (Regnery Gateway, Inc. 1986) (1859).
15 THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, supra note 11, at 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
16 Id. at 71.
17 Id. at 72.
18 STORY, supra note 14, § 171, at 144.

172

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW REFLECTION

[VOL. 95:5

neighbors . . . .”19 Washington’s actions in the Lighthouse litigation, for example,
seem to fall into the scope of the type of evils against which the commerce clauses
were designed to provide protection.
III.

PURPOSES OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSES AND LESSONS FROM THE ARTICLES
OF CONFEDERATION

We can more clearly understand when state legislation that asserts power over
commercial activities is problematic if we understand the situation of commerce at
the Founding and the work that the Framers intended the commerce clauses to do.
The facilitation of trade was a primary motivating purpose for replacing the Articles
of Confederation with the Constitution. And the commerce clauses were the vehicle
for accomplishing those ends. Joseph Story explains in his Familiar Exposition just
how bad the situation was for the free flow of commerce under the Articles:
The want of this power to regulate commerce was . . . a leading defect of the
Confederation. In the different States, the most opposite and conflicting
regulations existed; each pursued its own real or supposed local interests; each
was jealous of the rivalry of its neighbors; and each was successively driven to
retaliatory measures, in order to satisfy public clamor, or to alleviate private
distress. In the end, however, all their measures became utterly nugatory, or
mischievous, engendering mutual hostilities, and prostrating all their commerce
at the feet of foreign nations. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the oppressed
and degraded state of domestic commerce, manufactures, and agriculture, at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution.20

Indeed, a “major defect[] of the Articles of Confederation, and a compelling reason
for the calling of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, was the fact that the Articles
essentially left the individual States free to burden commerce both among
themselves and with foreign countries very much as they pleased.”21
Thus, one purpose of the commerce clauses is to prevent any single state’s
interference with the ability of other states to engage in commerce. In other words,
they were designed to preclude discriminatory or protectionist behavior that
disadvantages other states because the offending state is seeking a competitive edge
or is seeking to further its idiosyncratic policy preferences at the expense of another
state’s ability to engage in free trade.
Furthermore, the clauses operate to ensure that one state is not able to block
the ability of other states and their citizens to engage in foreign commerce. The very
definition of “[a]n unrestrained intercourse between the States,” Hamilton says in
Federalist No. 11, includes protecting the ability of every state to interchange—in
other words, coordinate—with other states to facilitate the “exportation to foreign
markets.”22 As stated by Hamilton,

19 James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 539, 542 (Max Farrand ed. 1911).
20 STORY, supra note 14, § 163, at 140.
21 Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976).
22 THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, supra note 11, at 71 (Alexander Hamilton).
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An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade
of each, by an interchange of their respective productions, not only for the supply
of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of
commerce in every part will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion
and vigour from a free circulation of the commodities of every part. 23

Reciprocal advantages abound so long as states respect each other in the free flow
of commerce. Indeed, each state has a self-interested reason to refrain from
interfering with commerce, principally that the other states will also refrain to that
state’s advantage. This reciprocal or agreed-upon restraint works to the mutual
advantage of all state participants in the system. I do not harm you in exchange for
a promise that you do not harm me. If we both fulfill that promise, we are both better
off. If either of us breaks the agreement, we risk devolution into chaos and struggle
and no one wins.
Madison saw fit in Federalist No. 42 to elaborate further on these important
points regarding mutual gains from free trade and the absence of barriers to it. That
passage in Federalist No. 42 is important but too often missed. There, Madison
closely evaluated the purposes of the commerce clauses and the interplay between
the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Foreign Commerce Clause. Madison’s
observations are worth quoting at length. First, Madison reiterated the failings of
trade that existed under the Articles of Confederation: “The defect of power in the
existing confederacy, to regulate the commerce between its several members, is in
the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience.” 24 Madison
then continued to explain that the commerce clauses—as combined with the Import
Export Clause of Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 of the Constitution—were the vital
ingredients to the new Constitution that could cure this defect: “To the proofs and
remarks which former papers have brought into view on this subject, it may be
added, that without this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of
regulating foreign commerce, would have been incompleat, and ineffectual.” 25 The
Import Export Clause provides that
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
it’s inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any
State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United
States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the
Congress.26

In Federalist No. 42, Madison continued to explain that whole document
review of the Constitution helps us understand the limitations on state interference
with trade and the ability of other states and their citizens to engage in it. Madison
first posited that the capacity to interfere with commerce is broad if unconstrained
by constitutional prohibition:

23
24
25
26

Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 11, at 283 (James Madison).
Id. (footnote omitted).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
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A very material object of this power was the relief of the States which import and
export through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by
the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it
must be foreseen that ways would be found out, to load the articles of import and
export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall
on the makers of the latter, and the consumers of the former. 27

Finally, Madison stressed that the history of human experience proves that, left
unchecked, states would interfere with commerce and it would lead to disastrous
effects for the fate of the Union and its prosperity. In Madison’s words:
We may be assured by past experience, that such a practice would be introduced
by future contrivances; and both by that and a common knowledge of human
affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate
in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity. To those who do not view the
question through the medium of passion or of interest, the desire of the
commercial States to collect in any form, an indirect revenue from their
uncommercial neighbours, must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair; since
it would stimulate the injured party, by resentment as well as interest, to resort to
less convenient channels for their foreign trade. But the mild voice of reason,
pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often
drowned before public bodies as well as individuals, by the clamours of an
impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain.28

Something more than an appeal to reason would be necessary to prevent states from
interfering with trade in practice on each occasion where the temptation would arise.
A constitutional architecture was erected to provide assurances of commercial flow.
Thus, the commerce clauses, in context with other portions of the Constitution
like the Import Export Clause and Duties and Imposts Clause, include not only a
noninterference principle between states but also ultimately cast regulatory authority
over commerce—including if, when, and how to use it—in a single source: the
federal government. As Hamilton further explained in Federalist No. 11, the
commerce clauses are designed to overcome the dangers of a “multiplicity of
causes”29 and to prevent interference with national interests.
The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, in particular, is designed to prohibit
states from displacing the federal government’s policymaking role in matters of
foreign trade. James Madison summed it up well in Federalist No. 42: the power to
regulate “forms an obvious and essential branch of the federal administration. If we
are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.”30
It is also worth noting that if any one state can interfere with foreign trade, it will
disincentivize foreign nations and their businesses from trading.
The Framers looked to historical examples of rogue internal actors in other
nations burdening foreign commerce with the nation writ large.31 For example, after
examining these lessons of history in Federalist No. 22, Hamilton noted that
27
28
29
30
31

THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 11, at 283 (James Madison).
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, supra note 11, at 72 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 11, at 279 (James Madison).
See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
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[i]t is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object, either
as it respects the interests of trade or finance that more strongly demands a
Federal superintendence. . . . No nation acquainted with the nature of our
political association would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the
United States, by which they conceded privileges of any importance to them,
while they were apprised that the engagements on the part of the Union, might at
any moment be violated by its members . . . .32

Strong individual state powers over commerce send a poor signal to foreign nations
that might want to cooperate, but who fear making commitments against the
backdrop of the possibility of rogue states.
The Framers understood that the disunity under the Articles of Confederation
and the dispersion of regulatory authority over interstate and foreign commerce open
the door for states to act selfishly. They also understood that disunity and dispersion
open the door to foreign capture, influence, lobbying, and control. Again in
Federalist No. 11, Hamilton described how European nations might be motivated to
combine if they sense weakness from disunion that would make it possible to
overcome individual states.
[I]n a state of disunion these combinations might exist, and might operate with
success. It would be in the power of the maritime nations, availing themselves
of our universal impotence, to prescribe the conditions of our political
existence; . . . in all probability [by] combin[ing] to embarrass our navigation in
such a manner, as would in effect destroy it, and confine us to a passive
commerce.33

But, by uniting under the Constitution—in no small part because of its
architectural features in the commerce clauses that make states interdependent—
much of this silliness and these unfortunate risks can be overcome. As explained in
more detail earlier, Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 11 that the states become
interdependent through the Interstate Commerce Clause in the Constitution because
each will see reciprocal benefits in taking advantage of the “diversity in the
productions of different States” in supporting each others’ access and “exportation
to foreign markets” because “[t]he veins of commerce . . . will acquire additional
motion and vigour from a free circulation of the commodities of every part.” 34
Through mutual cooperation there is opportunity for mutual gain. From mutual
disarmament from the weapons of protectionism, each state will see mutual
advantage. But because human nature did not always guarantee people would make
wise choices on their own, the Constitution was designed to institutionalize the
system and codify an agreement of noninterference. Indeed, as is so often the case
in understanding what the Constitution is aiming to do, Madison’s famous passage
on “if men were angels” serves a purpose here as well, especially when you
understand that state governments are just collections of individuals imbued with
human motivations and human flaws. In this famous passage, Madison observed

32
33
34

THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 11, at 136 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, supra note 11, at 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id. at 71.
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the necessity of embedding in the constitutional system mechanisms of
governmental accountability when he wrote:
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controuls on government would be necessary.
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul the
governed; and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself. A dependence on the
people is no doubt the primary controul on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.35

These commerce clauses and their cousins in the Constitution that help facilitate
trade and prevent state interference with trade are some of the auxiliary precautions
designed to shape an American federalism with thick free trade features.
CONCLUSION
Against this backdrop of the importance of limits on state authority to interfere
with commerce, potential bases for denying permits, banning products, or otherwise
controlling commercial activity with the purpose of preventing disfavored
commerce are illegitimate. The free market provisions in the Interstate Commerce
Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Indian Commerce Clause, the Export
Import Clause, the Duties and Imposts Clause and other parts of the Constitution are
designed to disempower states from erecting barriers to commerce; states cannot
circumvent the limits on their power by hiding behind other policy goals.
In conclusion, not everything about federalism is about leaving states alone to
do what they please. A state simply cannot shroud a market-manipulating regulation
in some public-spirited sounding justification about its rights or about its internal
interests legitimize it.36 Oftentimes that will either be a pretextual basis for imposing
the state’s will on other states and, even if it is not, it may nonetheless have negative
spillover effects on commerce that were meant to be contained by the firewalls
developed in the Constitution. In other words, a state may not cloak a regulation as
being in the public welfare when the law is actually intended to impede lawful
interstate or foreign commercial activity. Indeed, such commercial activity is
favored in our system of free trade federalism emboldened and protected by very
intentionally crafted component parts of the Constitution that limit the states’ rights
to act.

35 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 11, at 349 (James Madison).
36 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) (“If a state
law purporting to promote environmental purposes is in reality ‘simple economic protectionism,’
[a] ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity’ [applies].” (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).

